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Vaughan Black and Did She Mention My Name?:
Nicholas Richter* Citation of Academic Authority
by the Supreme Court of
Canada, 1985-1990
Introduction
Readers of court judgments will have observed that in the course of
expressing reasons for the decisions they reach, judges commonly refer
to books and articles written by academics. This is not surprising. Many
scholarly publications contain information, arguments and opinions
pertinent to the choices that judges must make, and lawyers commonly
refer to such works in the written and oral arguments they present to
courts. We would therefore expect the judges who must assess and
respond to such arguments to make mention of that scholarly material.
Moreover a certain portion of academic writing-in particular, a prepon-
derance of law review articles-is written as more or less direct exhorta-
tion tojudges about how to decide cases expected to come before them.1
Possibly this is no more than a rhetorical stance, for it may be that law
professors are really writing to other law professors (or to no one), and
that the practice of pretending to talk to appellate courts is simply a
stylistic device which they ritualistically, perhaps unthinkingly, adopt.
But presumably some portion of the writing that legal scholars ostensibly
direct at judges is actually intended to be read by them and to influence
the decisions they make. In any event, given the amount of writing
couched as advice to judges, the amount of writing on legal matters
generally, and lawyers' practice of citing such material in argument, it
comes as no shock to see that judges make reference to academic
publications in their judgments.
* Of Dalhousie Law School and Student-at-Law, Tory Tory DesLauriers & Binnington
respectively. Colleagues at both institutions provided helpful comments on this research.
Additional thanks are due to David Fraser, Andrew Heard and Alexandra Dobrowolsky.
1. It is remarkable how much legal academic writing is directed to judges, particularly
appellate ones, as opposed to the relatively small amount directed at legislators and adminis-
trators. For a helpful recent discussion of the audience for law review articles see S. Levinson,
"The Audience for Constitutional Metatheory (Or, Why, and to Whom, Do I Write the Things
I Do?)" (1992), 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 389. See also thecomments on Levinson's paperby D. Ebel,
P. Bobbitt and P. Schlag in the same issue of that journal.
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Although there has been research on this phenomenon in American
courts,2 we know of no published work which attempts to look in a
systematic way at the practice of judicial citation of academic writing in
Canada. Some studies in this country, such as the Arthurs Report,3 have
made a few remarks on the subject, and in 1950 George Nicholls
published some fascinating observations, 4 but there is a lack of published
material approaching the subject in a quantitative fashion. What follows
is an initial attempt at an empirical examination of forensic citation of
scholarly writing in Canada. We focus on a limited recent period of time
and on the judgments of just one court, the Supreme Court of Canada.
Methodology
We start with some remarks on taxonomy and methodology. While an
important functional unit of our study was Supreme Court decisions, a
more important and more frequently used unit was thejudgment. Through-
out this paper we use the term 'judgment' to denote a separate set of
reasons written by an individual judge or group of judges. Generally a
judgment has only one author, though occasionally two or more judges
put their names to a particular set of reasons. It is important to distinguish
judgments from decisions. A decision (or case) is one or more judgments
that comprise the totality of the Court's published reasoning in a particu-
lar matter. Thus a unanimous decision contains just one judgment, to
which all of thejudges who heard the matter subscribe. A non-unanimous
decision, on the other hand, comprises more than one judgment and
represents a difference of opinion among the judges, even if the judges all
eventually reach the same result.
We searched Supreme Court cases for citations of academic writing,
compiling separate data for individual judgments and for co-authored
judgments. In attributing citations we ignored any judges who concurred
in a particular judgment. That is, if Justice A wrote a one-sentence
2. W. Daniels, "'Far Beyond the Law Reports': Secondary Source Citations in United States
Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900,1940, and 1978" (1983), 76 Law Library J. 1;
C. Newland, "Legal Periodicals and the United States Supreme Court" (1959), 7 Kansas L.
Rev. 477; J. Schurlock, "Scholarship and the Courts" (1964), 32 UKMCL. Rev. 228; L. Siroco
and J. Marguiles, "The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study"
(1986), 34U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 131; andN. Bernstein, "The Supreme Courtand Secondary Source
Material: 1965 Term" (1968), 57 Georgetown L. J. 57.
3. Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, Law and Learning, Report to the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada by the Consultative Group on
Research and Education in Law, (Chair, H. W. Arthurs, 1983), pp. 62-3.
4. G. V. V. Nicholls, "Legal Periodicals and the Supreme Court of Canada" (1950), 28 Can.
Bar Rev. 422.
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judgment which said only that she concurred in the judgment written by
Justice B, then even if Justice B's reasons contained a number of citations
of academic authority we did not consider Justice A to have cited any such
authority. In other words, our focus was on the authors of the judgments
in question and not onjudges who merely expressed agreement with those
authors.
For each of the Court's decisions from 1985 to 1990 inclusive, we
compiled information about the author(s) of the judgment(s), giving us a
database of 620 cases comprising 993 separate judgments. We also
collected data about which academic authorities were cited in each
judgment. In addition we compiled information about whether a decision
was unanimous or non-unanimous, whether an issue concerning the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was raised, and whether the
case involved Qu6bec's Civil Code. Where possible, we identified the
gender of the authors being cited. All of this information we entered into
a database, from which we produced the reports appearing in this article.
As our study developed, we were forced to make a number ofjudgment
calls about the ways in which we would collect our data. So, for example,
we decided that certain types of cases reported in the Supreme Court
Reports would not qualify as decisions and would not be included in our
study. These cases involved such matters as an application to vary an
order refusing leave to appeal, an application for an extension of time to
apply for leave to appeal, an application to quash an appeal, a rehearing
on the issue of costs, and various motions and orders relating to the
Court's internal procedures. In short, we chose to focus only on those
Supreme Court decisions relating to the merits of the disputes brought
before the Court.
We also had some difficulty deciding what would constitute an
'academic', 'secondary' or 'scholarly'-we use those adjectives inter-
changeably-authority. Some of the works cited by the judges of the
Court were clearly non-academic and were therefore excluded from our
study. Examples include works of fiction,5 non-legal encyclopediae,
edited collections of public documents, United Nations resolutions, and
non-legal dictionaries. Other works fell more nearly on the borderline.
5. In excluding from our study references to works of imaginative literature we do not mean
to imply that we consider them irrelevant to 'the law'. They are, and for a very amusing analysis
of this point see D. Fraser, "The Owls Are Not What They Seem: David Lynch, the Madonna
Question, and Critical Legal Studies" (1993), 18 Queen's L. J. 1. In our view, however, when
Supreme Court judges drop a reference to Bleak House or The Merchant of Venice, they think
they are doing something different than what they do when they quote Peter Hogg's Canadian
Constitutional Law, and the activity which is the subject of this paper is the latter.
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Ultimately we excluded political speeches (including references to
Hansard), legal dictionaries, committee proceedings, and professional
handbooks such as the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants'
Handbook and the Canadian Bar Association's Code of Professional
Conduct. On the other hand, we included the Canadian Encyclopedic
Digest, American Jurisprudence, Corpus Juris Secundum, and United
Nations studies and reports.
On a related matter, we encountered some metaphysical problems
concerning issues of identity with respect to a particular authority. In
particular, we wondered whether multiple editions of a textbook, some
with different authors, were all to count as the same authority. Many of
the major legal texts undergo a number of revisions over the years, with
new authors being substituted as the original authors retire or pass away.6
Ultimately we decided that multiple editions of a work constitute one
authority, and that such a work's original authors are its only authors.
A Canadian twist on this problem is whether a work published in both
French and English nevertheless remains the same authority. In some
cases the same work wouldbe cited by somejudges in French (usually the
original) and by other judges in English (usually a translation). We had
less difficulty with these works: we treated them as the same authority.
We also treated corporate authors, such as law reform commissions, as
single authors.
Having determined what would constitute an authority, we also had to
decide what would count as a citation of any particular authority. One
problem that arose on several occasions was the difference between a
judge's simply mentioning an authority and ajudge's actually relying on
one. Where ajudge referred to an authority and relied on that authority to
make a point, we counted the reference as a citation. On the other hand,
when a judge referred to an authority in the course of recounting or
summarizing the decision of thelower courts, but did not use the authority
in giving his or her own opinion, we did not count it. The difficult cases
were where a judge referred to an authority in giving his or her own
opinion but did not explicitly rely on it. In those cases, we assumed that
the inclusion of an authority was meant to buttress the judge's argument,
or at least to import into it some meaning beyond the mere description of
another court's activity, so we counted them as citations. We contem-
plated drawing a distinction between those instances when judges ex-
pressed agreement with a work they were citing and those where they
6. See, for example, the many editions of Cheshire & Fifoot's Law of Contracts and Laskin's
Canadian Constitutional Law.
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expressed disagreement, but in the end we decided that such a distinction
would be too difficult to implement. There are a great many instances
where judges merely state that they have read a certain book or article on
the subject before them, without otherwise telling us whether they agreed
or disagreed with it. Likewise they often cite or quote a secondary source
and then express some partial agreement, or say that while they do not
wholeheartedly endorse it they found it to be helpful. In short, we
encountered a wide variety of nuances ofjudicial reaction to the scholarly
sources judges mentioned, and we ultimately decided to attempt no
distinction among them.
In enumerating citations of academic authority, we laid down an
arbitrary rule that a work could be cited only once per judgment. Thus, if
Dickson C.J.C. cited Hogg' s Canadian Constitutional Law three times in
the same judgment, we counted that as just a single citation. On the other
hand, if within the same case two or more judges cited Hogg's book in
separate judgments, we attributed each judge with one citation of that
book. Thus while a work could be cited only once per judgment, it might
be cited several times in a given decision.
Final issues we had to consider were how to distinguish between
Charter and non-Charter decisions, and between Civil Code and non-
Civil Code decisions. In some cases, one of the parties would raise a
Charter issue but the Court would reach its decision without resort to the
Charter. We wondered whether such decisions should count as Charter
decisions or whether we should only include cases actually decided on the
basis of the Charter. Ultimately we decided that any case in which a
Charter issue was raised would count as a Charter decision, regardless
of whether the Court relied on the Charter in reaching its decision. We
were similarly inclusive with Civil Code decisions. We included in that
category any case on appeal from the courts of Qu6bec in which a Civil
Code issue or argument was raised. We did not, however, include in the
Civil Code category all Qu6bec cases dealing with private law. So appeals
from Qu6bec courts dealing with federal private law (bankruptcy, for
example) or with Qu6bec legislation apart from the Civil Code (for
example, its statutes dealing with labour relations and consumer protec-
tion, or its Code of Civil Procedure) were not included in the Civil Code
category unless the Civil Code was also mentioned.
Results
Our initial observation is that, while the Supreme Court as a whole is quite
consistent in its frequency of academic citation over the period in
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question, the practice of individual judges vis-h-vis other judges varies
considerably.
First the Court as a whole. The Court cited academic authority in just
under half the decisions it rendered (298 out of 620 = 48%). As Table 1
shows, 40% of the 993 judgments written by members of the Court
featured at least one mention of a scholarly source. Of course many of
those contained more than one citation, and the average number of
citations per judgment was 2.0. If we isolate just those judgments in
which there is some mention of secondary authority and check for the
frequency of academic citation in them, then, as the lower right-hand box
in Table I shows, the average number of such references during the six-
year period was 5.3.
Table 1
Citation Record of the Supreme Court of Canada by Year, 1985-90
Total Percent of Total Average # Average # of
judgments judgments with cites of cites per cites per
citations judgment judgment with
cites
1985 112 35.7% (40) 208 1.9 5.2
1986 117 44.4% (52) 205 1.8 3.9
1987 152 35.5% (54) 276 1.8 5.1
1988 155 38.7% (60) 284 1.8 4.7
1989 207 42.5% (88) 382 1.8 4.3
1990 250 41.2% (103) 659 2.6 6.4
Total
1985-90 993 40.0% (397) 2,014 2.0 5.3
It is possible to arrive at differing assessments of these general data as
to frequency of citation of academic sources; some persons may be
surprised at how commonly the Court cites such sources, while others
may lament that the Court does not refer to such materials more often.
Certainly there is academic writing on virtually every issue which comes
before the Supreme Court, so the fact that such works are mentioned in
only 48% of cases and just 40% of individual judgments may be
construed as indicating that in the majority of instances the members of
the Court were either unaware of that scholarship or simply did not find
it necessary or helpful to their deliberations. On the other hand, it should
be noted that a significant number of the Court's decisions are very brief
and say little more than that the Court dismisses the appeal and agrees
with the reasoning of the court(s) below. Such decisions display no
detailed reasoning and of course contain no citations (academic or
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otherwise), but they counted as judgments for the purposes of this study.7
If such decisions were removed from consideration, one could say of
those remaining Supreme Court decisions which do display detailed
reasoning that academic authority is cited more often than not.
Regardless of whether one considers the rate of citation in this six-year
period to be high or low, it represents a notable increase over the rate that
prevailed a generation earlier, a period when, as theArthurs Report noted,
"[legal treatises and articles were seldom cited in argument or referred
to in judgments".' While the focus of this study was not principally an
inter-temporal one, we did undertake limited examinations of the Su-
preme Court Reports for 1957, 1967 and 1977 so that some comparison
might be made with the period on which our study mainly focuses. A
perusal of the Supreme Court Reports for 1957 revealed that in that year
just 15% of decisions therein (10 out of 66) made any mention of
secondary writing.9 Ten years later things had not changed: the Supreme
Court Reports for 1967 contain citations only in 13.3% decisions (12 out
of 90). Another decade on, the Court's citation rate showed only a modest
increase: the Supreme Court Reports for 1977 reveal citations in 21.6%
of the decisions (35 out of 162). By this historical measure, the fact that
48% of decisions in the 1986-1990 period display citations to secondary
authority reveals that in the span of a generation the frequency of
reference to scholarly writing has more than tripled.
Within the six-year period under consideration there is little indication
of significant temporal change in the percentage of judgments which
7. We contemplated trying to differentiate these judgments so that we could then focus
exclusively on the lengthier ones, but there seemed no obvious dividing line between short and
longjudgments. Some are only two or three sentences long (and rarely contain citations), others
are two or three paragraphs, others two or three pages, and so on. Ultimately we decided not
to attempt any classification into short and long judgments.
8. Supra, note 3, at p. 65. The quotation comes in a passage describing the state of Canadian
legal scholarship previous to the expansion of law faculties in the 1960s and 1970s. TheArthurs
Report goes on to note that this was a period in which "the view prevailed in some quarters that
living authors could not be cited [in court]." (p. 65) For further discussion of this see G. V. V.
Nicholls, supra, note 4.
9. Most of those references were brief, and five of the ten decisions which contained
references to academic writing were cases dealing with the Quebec Civil Code, where the use
of doctrine is a long established tradition. See infra atTable4 and accompanying text. Note that
our enumeration of the frequency of citation in the Supreme Court Reports for 1957, 1967 and
1977 did not look at individual judgments, did not take note of which judges made reference
to secondary authority, and did not take note of which authors were cited. It merely made note
of which decisions contained references to academic sources and which did not. It should also
be noted that the Supreme Court Reports for 1957 and 1967 did not report alljudgments handed
down by the Court for that year, whereas the S.C.R.s for 1977 and for the ten-year period
covered by our study did include virtually all decisions made by the Court in the respective
years.
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mentioned academic authority. As the third column in Table 1 shows, the
portion of judgments which cited such authority hovered around 40% in
each of the six years. As the fourth column reveals, the raw number of
citations per year did show a general increase. However this is attribut-
able to the fact that the number ofjudgments per year increased, more than
doubling between 1985 and 1990, principally due to the fact that the
number of decisions increased over that period. In other words, in the six-
year period we looked at, the number of academic citations increased only
because the number of judgments and decided cases increased. Despite
the considerable change in the composition of the Court during the time
in question, the average number of citations per judgment remained
remarkably stable at about 1.8 over the first five years of the six-year
period, and jumped significantly only in the final year.
In addition to examining the work of the Supreme Court as a whole, we
looked at the behaviour of its members. Several individual judges-
Beetz, Chouinard, Cory, Estey and Le Dain JJ., and Dickson C.J.-cite
secondary authority with a frequency approaching the Court's norm. Not
surprisingly, however, others adopt a practice which departs from the
norm. As the third column of Table 2 demonstrates, some judges refer to
secondary sources far more frequently than do others.
The judge with the greatest propensity to cite academic authority
during the years in question was L'Heureux-Dub6 J., who did so in 58.9%
of her judgments. Although six judges (Wilson, Lamer, La Forest,
McIntyre and Sopinka JJ., and Dickson C.J) wrote more judgments than
did L'Heureux-Dub6 J., only one (Wilson J.) made a greater number of
references to secondary sources. Not only did L'Heureux-Dub6 J. refer
to secondary authority in a higher percentage of her judgments than any
otherjudge-58.9% compared to 38.8% for the Court as a whole without
her-she also cited more frequently in those judgments. For example, La
Forest J. referred to academic authority in almost the same percentage of
his judgments (56.1%) as did L'Heureux-Dub6 J. However, as the right-
hand column of Table 2 shows, those judgments by L'Heureux-Dub6 J.
which did feature academic citations contained on average 72.5% more
citations than did those judgments by La Forest J. containing citations:
8.8 for L'Heureux-Dub6 J., 5.1 for La Forest J.
At the other end of the scale, judgments written by Lamer J. were the
least likely to make mention of secondary sources, doing so just 25.7%
of the time. However when he did choose to refer to academic writings
Lamer J. did not hold back: those of his judgments which did cite
scholarly writing made reference to an average of 4.8 different sources,
more than any other judge except L'Heureux-Dub6, La Forest and
Wilson JJ., and Dickson C.J.
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Table 2
Citation Record of Individual Judges, 1985-90
Total Percent of Total Average # Average # of
judgments judgments with cites of cites per cites per
citations judgment judgment with
cites
Beetz 50 38.0% (19) 84 1.7 4.4
Chouinard 17 41.2% (7) 32 1.9 4.6
Cory 37 40.5% (15) 38 1.0 2.5
Dickson 107 38.3% (41) 239 2.2 5.8
Estey 35 42.8% (15) 64 1.8 4.2
Gonthier 17 47.0% (8) 56 3.3 4.3
L'Heureux-Dub6 56 58.9% (33) 290 5.8 8.8
La Forest 98 56.1% (55) 284 2.9 5.1
Lamer 136 25.7% (35) 168 1.2 4.8
Le Dain 38 36.8% (14) 64 1.7 4.5
McIntyre 81 32.1% (26) 99 1.2 3.8
McLachlin 41 51.2% (21) 77 1.9 3.7
Sopinka 70 34.2% (24) 77 1.1 3.3
Wilson 147 51.7% (76) 388 2.6 5.1
Mixed' O  63 12.7% (8) 52 .8 6.5
SCC total 993 40.0% (397) 2,014 2.0 5.3
This distinction between the percentage of judgments which contain
citations and the tendency to cite a lot is significant. For example Dickson
C.J. was slightly less likely than other members of the Court to write
reasons featuring references to academic sources, doing so in just 38.3%
of his judgments. But when he did decide to deliver ajudgment displaying
references to scholarly authority, the former chiefjustice cited an average
of 5.8 different sources, more than anyone except L'Heureux-Dub6 J. By
way of contrast, McLachlin J. might be categorized as a judge who is
more likely than not-and more likely than the average member of the
Court-to cite secondary authority, but who is unlikely to cite a wide
range of such sources: fully 51.2% of herjudgments contain citations, but
those of her judgments which do include cites display fewer on average
(3.7) than anyone except those by Sopinka and Cory JJ.
While we were compiling our data we wondered whether the Court's
citation practice might be affected by the judges' clerks. Some American
studies, for example, have suggested that the tendency of the United
States Supreme Court to cite the Harvard Law Review more than any
other legal periodical might be attributable to the fact that a dispropor-
10. We described as 'mixed' those judgments written by more than one judge. Such
judgments did not figure in the data for individual judges but are included in the data collected
for the court as a whole.
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tionate number of the judges' clerks are graduates of Harvard Law
School. We were unable to determine from our data whether clerks at
the Supreme Court of Canada have any effect on which sources are cited,
though it seems reasonable to think that the clerks might have some effect
by bringing certain sources to the judges' attention while deciding that
other sources discovered in their research are not useful or relevant. We
also wondered whether the judges' clerks had any effect on frequency of
citation. During the period of our study Supreme Court judges had more
than one clerk (two from 1985-1988 and three thereafter), so even if the
clerks did have a significant impact on frequency of citation this impact
would not likely be revealed by our data unless all the clerks of a given
judge were influencing citation rates in the same direction-either
upward or downward. Even if a judge's clerks were capable of having
such a collective influence, however, we found no significant variations
in annual citation rates. As Table 1 showed, there were no significant
variations for the Court as a whole, and while we have not reproduced
here a year-by-year breakdown of data for each judge our observation is
that most judges are consistent from year to year. Table 3 sets out the six-
year breakdown for academic citation by Dickson C.J., whose consis-
tency over time is characteristic of the other judges.
Table 3
Citation Record of Dickson CJ., 1985-90
Judgments Judgments Total Average # Average # of
with cites of cites per cites per
cites judgment judgment with
cites
1985 19 6 35 1.8 5.8
1986 12 6 32 2.6 5.3
1987 19 6 39 2.0 6.5
1988 22 8 38 1.7 4.8
1989 15 8 37 2.5 4.6
1990 20 7 58 2.9 8.2
Total 107 41 239 2.2 5.8
While this table reveals some variation from year to year, there is far
less annual fluctuation than one would expect to observe if the frequency
of that judge's reference to secondary sources was heavily influenced by
his clerks. Similarly, L'Heureux-Dub6 J., a frequent and prolific citer,
was consistently so; her citation rate was above the Court average for each
11. See W. Daniels, supra, note 2, at 15-16 and N. Bernstein, supra, note 2, at 67.
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of the six years. And in each of the six years judgments written by Lamer
J. were less likely than those of the Court as a whole to contain a reference
to secondary authority. In short, we did not find much evidence to suggest
that the identity of ajudge's clerk had any great influence on that judge's
propensity to mention academic writings in his or her judgments.
Some interesting observations emerge from examinations of various
groupings ofjudges. The threejudges who before their appointment to the
bench had worked as full-time legal academics (Beetz, La Forest and Le
Dain JJ.) cited in 47.0% of their judgments, while those who had not
pursued academic careers cited in 40.1%. Thus, while the sample is not
large, one can tentatively suggest that the fact that before elevation to the
bench ajudge has worked as a legal academic may increase the likelihood
that that judge will write decisions containing references to scholarly
publications.
Likewise a judge's gender appears to have an effect on citation
behaviour. The three female judges were among the four most frequent
citers on the Court. Those three (McLachlin, L'Heureux-Dub6 and
Wilson JJ.) cited academic authority in 53.3 % (130/244) of the judgments
they wrote; the males in just 38.2% (259/678).
One might expect that the Qu6bec judges as a group would be more
frequent in their reliance on academic authority than their common law
counterparts, fortheory has it that la doctrine is a significant source of law
in the civil law tradition while in the common law tradition it is merely
a guide. However as a group the Qu6bec judges (Beetz, Chouinard,
Gonthier, L'Heureux-Dub6 and Lamer JJ.) cited in only 36.9% of their
judgments, while the others cited in 43.9% of theirs. However if one
isolates the relatively small number of judgments dealing with Qu6bec's
Civil Code, those judgments-almost all of which are written by the
Qu6bec judges-are far more likely to contain references to secondary
authority than are non-Civil Code judgments. As Table 4 shows, fully
87.5% (21 out of 24) of decisions dealing with Civil Code matters
displayed such references. In addition the average number of citations in
Civil Code cases, 6.9, was well above the average of 3.0 for those cases
which did not deal with the Civil Code.
Table 4
Citations in Civil Code and Non-Civil Code Cases
Number Cases Total Average # Average # of
of with cites of cites cites per
cases cites per case case with
cites
Civil Code 24 3.9% 21 87.5% 201 8.4 9.5
Non-Civil Code 596 96.1% 277 46.5% 1813 3.0 6.5
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In short, the tradition of referring to scholarly writings to interpret the
Civil Code is followed in the Supreme Court, but those same judges who
write the Civil Code judgments are by no means as likely to refer to
academic writing in their non-Civil Code judgments.
Other breakdowns by case type also reveal interesting differences in
the practice of judicial citation of academic writing. Judges are far more
likely to make reference to secondary sources when they are writing non-
unanimous judgments than when they are writing something with which
the rest of the bench agrees, as Table 5 shows.
Table 5
Citations in Unanimous and Non-Unanimous Cases
Number Cases Total Average # Average # of
of with cites of cites cites per
cases cites per case case with
cites
Unanimous 395 63.7% 140 35.4% 701 1.8 5.0
Non-Unanimous 225 36.3% 158 70.2% 1313 5.8 8.3
Although non-unanimous cases accounted for only 36.3% of all cases
decided by the Court in the period under investigation, those cases
accounted for fully 65.2% (1313/2014) of all citations. Fully 70.2% of
non-unanimous cases contained citations, and both the average number
of citations per case and the average number of citations per case
containing citations was significantly greater in non-unanimous than in
unanimous decisions (5.8 to 1.8 and 8.3 to 5.0 respectively). It would thus
appear that when a judge is writing for a Court which is united in its
thinking, he or she is unlikely to appeal to academic publications for
support. However, a judge composing a judgment which pursues an
approach different than that chosen by fellow judges is far more likely to
make mention of the published works of scholars. Evidently the act of
disagreeing with one's colleagues increases the need to enlist support
from the academy.
We hypothesized that judicial use of scholarly writings might be
different in cases involving the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms. The Charteris relatively new, and atleastin the early years covered
by this study there was relatively little judicial authority on its interpre-
tation and application. Consequently judges who wished to buttress their
judgments in Charter cases by appeals to authority might, in the the
absence of available judicial authority, have to resort to scholarly writ-
ings. In addition, the requirement to refer to "such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and demo-
cratic society" which appears in s. 1 of the Charter might be expected to
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promote forensic use of empirical sociological data, and such data are
often found in scholarly publications. Accordingly we drew a distinction
between Charter and non-Charter cases and compared citation rates
between the two groups. As Table 6 shows, that comparison confirmed
our hypothesis that Charter cases are somewhat more likely to display
references to secondary sources than non-Charter cases. Moreover, those
Charter cases which contain citations contain on average more citations
than do those non-Charter cases with citations.
Table 6
Citations in Charter and Non-Charter Cases
Number Cases Total Average # Average # of
of with cites of cites cites per
cases cites per case case with
cites
Charter 162 26.1% 89 54.9% 763 4.7 8.5
Non-Charter 458 73.9% 209 45.6% 1251 2.7 6.0
In addition to looking to see which judges cited most frequently and in
what sort of cases citations most commonly appeared, our study focussed
on who was cited by the Supreme Court. We looked to see which authors
and works were cited most often by the Court and were not surprised to
see Peter Hogg head the list, narrowly outpolling even the Law Reform
Commission of Canada, which is included as a corporate author. Indeed
Hogg was mentioned more than twice as much as any other individual
author, with fully one out of every 44 citations made by the Court (46/
2014). Table 7 sets out a list of those authors cited at least 10 times during
the period in question, along with the names of the judges responsible for
the greatest number of citations to those authors.
In addition to checking for which authors were most frequently cited,
our database allowed us to ascertain the most frequently cited individual
works. This search shows that Peter Hogg's Constitutional Law of
Canada is by far the Court's favourite single academic source. Putting
aside Halsbury's Laws of England (a multi-volume general reference
work), Hogg' s tome was cited more than twice as much as any other book.
Table 8 sets out the authorities cited 8 times or more, and the number of
times each was cited.
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Table 7
Authors Cited 10 or More Times, 1985-1990
1. Hogg, Peter12
2. L.R.C. of Canada
3. Halsbury
4. Cross, Rupert
5. Cot6, Pierre-Andr6
6. Driedger, Elmer
7. Wigmore, John
8. Tarnopolsky, Walter
9. Gibson, Dale
Manning, Morris
Stuart, Don
Williams, Glanville
10. Mewett, Alan
11. Sharpe, Robert
12. Fleming, John
de Smith, S.A.
13. Colvin, Eric
Baudouin, J.-L.
Laskin, Bora
Weiler, Paul
14. Garant, Patrice
Pepin, Gilles
1. Hogg, Peter
2. Halsbury
3. Cot6, P.-A.
Cross, Rupert
Wigmore, John
4. Driedger, E.
5. Stuart, Don
6. Fleming, John
7. de Smith, S.A.
8. Maxwell, Peter
McWilliams, P.
Mewett, A. &
Manning, M.
9. Blackstone, W.
Pepin, G. &
Ouellette, Y.
Tribe, L.
Weiler, Paul
Wilson (11)
La Forest (12)
Estey (7)
Sopinka (7)
Lamer (5)
La Forest (5)
Sopinka (5)
Wilson, La Forest & McIntyre (3)
Wilson (5)
Wilson, McIntyre & Lamer (4)
Lamer (4)
Wilson (6)
McIntyre, McLachlin & Lamer (3)
La Forest & Wilson (2)
Wilson (5)
Estey & L'Heureux-Dub6 (3)
Lamer (5)
L'Heureux-Dub6 (5)
La Forest (3)
Wilson, Dickson, La Forest & McIntyre (2)
L'Heureux-Dub6 (3)
L'Heureux-Dub6 (5)
Table 8
Works cited 8 or more times, 1985-90
Constitutional Law of Canada
Halsbury's Laws of England
Interpretation of Legislation in Canada
Cross on Evidence
Evidence in Trials at Common Law
Construction of Statutes
Canadian Criminal Law
Fleming on Torts
Judicial Review ofAdministrative Action
Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes
Canadian Criminal Evidence
Criminal Law
Commentaries on the Laws of England
Principes de contentieux administratif
American Constitutional Law
Reconcilable Differences
12. Italicization of an author's name denotes that citations to that person include works of
joint authorship. Note that this has the effect of making some citations count more than once.
For example, both Morris Manning and Alan Mewett have published works of sole authorship
which were cited by the Court (6 and 5 times respectively). There were also 9 citations to a work
ofjoint Mewett and Manning authorship, and these counted 9 times for each author, promoting
both to the 10-and-over list.
Did She Mention My Name?
The 16 works in Table 8 are all treatises; no periodical articles are
among them. Indeed, the most frequently mentioned article, A.G.
Amsterdam's "Speedy Criminal Trials: Rights and Remedies", 3 was
mentioned by the Court on just four occasions. It is unsurprising that no
articles are referred to as often as the most frequently cited books. Books
are longer and typically deal in detail with several different issues, so a
single book might be viewed as a source of authority on a range of issues.
Articles, on the other hand, generally deal with a more confined issue, and
obviously are likely to be cited only in connection with that one matter.
There is another difference between books and articles which may go
some way to explain the disparity in citation frequency. As an
overgeneralization, it might be said that articles often advance cutting-
edge normative arguments while books tend to contain positive state-
ments of the way the law is. Certainly that observation holds true of many
of the books in Table 8, which are standard pedagogic texts/professional
resource books. That supports the observation that in many cases the
Supreme Court cites scholarship simply as an authoritative statement of
the way the law presently is, not as an instance of an argument for how
the law should be changed.
The 16 most-cited works can be grouped into a smaller set of catego-
ries: three are evidence texts; three are books on statutory construction;
there are two books each on constitutional, administrative and criminal
law; there are also two general treatises on English law; and there is one
book on torts and one on labour law. These are all areas in which the Court
does substantial work, so one is not surprised to see the frequent citation
of books on those fields. It should be noted, however, that there are other
such areas in which the Supreme Court does a significant amount of work
but where no texts are found on the most-cited list-contracts, family law,
succession, immigration, property law, equity, trusts, intellectual prop-
erty and taxation.
Practitioners appearing before the Supreme Court may be interested in
knowing which of the standard legal texts are most favoured by the Court.
As Table 8 indicates, the most frequently cited evidence texts are the
treatises by Cross and Wigmore (17 citations each). Schiff was cited 7
times, Phipson and Archbold were cited 6 times each, and Delisle 3 times.
Interestingly, the popular text by Sopinka and Lederman was cited only
once during the period of our study (by Dickson C.J.). In administrative
law de Smith received the most citations (10), followed by Pepin &
Ouellette (8), Wade and Dussault & Borgeat (5 each), Garant (3) and
13. (1975), 27 Stan. L. Rev. 525.
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Davis (2). The ranking for texts on statutory interpretation was as follows:
Cot6 (17), Driedger (14), Maxwell (9), Pigeon (4) and Craies (3). In tort
law, Fleming's text was the overwhelming favourite of the Court (11
citations), followed by Linden (3) and Salmond (2). In addition two
French language texts on delictual responsibility were frequently cited:
Baudouin (5) and Nadeau & Nadeau (3). In the area of contract law, on
the other hand, there was no clear favourite: Anson' s text had 3 citations,
as did Cheshire & Fifoot, Corbin and Waddams; Chitty, Treitel and
Fridman each had two, while Williston was mentioned just once. Two
French language texts on the law of obligations were frequently cited:
Tancelin (4) and Baudouin (3). Property texts were cited infrequently.
There are a number of authors whose names appear on the most-cited
author list but whose works do not appear on the most-cited works list.
These would appear to be instances where the Court owes an allegiance
to an author but not to any particular work of that author. In some such
cases the Court values an author's work in a certain area. For example the
Court's 15 citations to Dale Gibson are to 10 different works by that
author, but those are all in the field of Canadian constitutional law.
Similar observations can be made about Walter Tarnopolsky in human
rights (16 cites to 6 different works) and Glanville Williams in criminal
law (15 cites to 8 different works). However this is not always the case:
the Court's 13 citations to Robert Sharpe are to eight different works in
seven relatively distinct fields: free speech, enforcement of foreign
judgments, habeas corpus, product liability, injunctions, mootness and
federal court jurisdiction.14
Our gender breakdown of the list of persons cited by the Supreme
Court indicates that men outnumbered women by more than ten to one
14. We initially speculated that this might in part be due to Dean Sharpe's employment as
Executive Legal Officer at the Supreme Court of Canada. It is not implausible to assume that
the fact that a scholar is present in the Supreme Court Building on a daily basis might increase
the likelihood of that person's scholarship being cited by the Court. However our data do not
bear this out. Dean Sharpe began working at the Court in January of 1988, but citations to his
work begin well before that (e.g., 4 in 1985) and are fairly evenly spread over the 1985-90
period covered by our study.
Did She Mention My Name?
(721/7 1).'1 Moreover, as a glance at the lists of most cited authors and
most cited works reveals, those women who were mentioned by the Court
were not among those writers mentioned most often; none appears on
either list. The most-cited females were Katherine Swinton and Christine
Boyle, each of whom was mentioned four times. The four references to
Swinton were to three different articles, and those to Boyle were all to her
book SexualAssault (making that the most cited work written by a woman
in the period covered by our study). This is a significant under-represen-
tation, for certainly women account for well over 10% of the scholarly
writing on matters which come before the Court. No doubt there are
'structural features' which may be invoked to explain this gender imbal-
ance. For example, many of the works frequently cited by the Court are
works by established, senior scholars (or dead scholars, such as Wigmore),
and one would expect a preponderance of males among such sources. No
doubt there is a cycle at work here. Writers get cited by the court in part
because they are perceived to be authorities, and that in turn confers on
those writers (who are mostly male) a renewed authority which increases
the likelihood that they will be cited in the future. The citation practice of
the Supreme Court of Canada does little to disrupt this cycle.' 6
Another interesting area of investigation concerns the citation of
authors and works available only in French. A familiar complaint of
qu6becois francophone legal scholars is that their works, particularly
those unavailable in English translation, are ignored by English speaking
Canadians.17 The data provide some support for this. Of course one is not
surprised to see that citations to works on the civil law are made virtually
15. Our method of sexing the scholars was as follows. For those we did not know personally,
we classified them by given names; for example, persons named Robert were assumed to be
male, while those named Elizabeth were assumed to be female. When the Supreme Court's
citation gave only the initials of the author's given name(s) we went to other sources, such as
the work cited or various directories of law professors, in order to locate full names so that we
might determine the writer's gender. Those with sexually ambiguous names, such as Robin,
were not assigned to either category unless we could otherwise determine their sex. For books
and articles written by more than one author, we counted them as gendered only if all authors
were of the same sex; otherwise we excluded them from this calculation. Law reform
commissions were viewed as sexless and so were likewise excluded. Thus when we report that
men outnumber women 721 to 71, that covers only those secondary sources to whom we were
able to assign a gender. Moreover it seems likely that there is some error in this figure due to
the fact that our method will wrongly classify some writers (e.g., any men named Sue).
16. Nor, as a glance at our footnotes reveals, does the citation practice in this article.
17. J. Deschenes, "On Legal Separatism in Canada" (1978), 12 L.S.U.C. Gazette 1. See also
J.-L. Baudouin, "The Impact of the Common Law on the Civilian Systems of Louisiana and
Quebec" in The Role ofJudicial Decisions andDoctrine in Civil Laiv andMixed Jurisdictions,
J. Dainow, ed., (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U. Press, 1974), at p. 18 and R. Macdonald,
"Understanding Civil Law Scholarship in Quebec" (1985), 23 Osgoode Hall L.J. 373, at 374.
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exclusively by the Qu6bec judges, for it is they who write the judgments
on civil law matters. However there are books in French by qu6becois
scholars dealing with national legal subjects such as evidence, constitu-
tional law, statutory interpretation and criminal law, and none of those
made it onto Table 8's list of most cited works. For example neither
Jacques Fortin's Trait6 de DroitP6nal G6n6ralnor his Preuve P6nal was
ever cited by an anglophonejudge, and neither appears on the 8-and-over
list, though several works in English on those subjects do. Similarly Guy
Tremblay's Droit Constitutional is not cited by any anglophone judge.
By way of contrast, more than one quarter of the citations of Hogg's
Constitutional Law of Canada (which has not appeared in French
translation) are attributable to Qu6becjudges. The sole French-only book
to appear on the 8-and-over list is Pepin and Ouellette's Principes de
Contentieux Administratif, with 8 citations, and 7 of those 8 citations
were by Qu6bec judges. By way of contrast, the other administrative law
text on the 8-and-over list was de Smith's JudicialReview ofAdministra-
tive Action with 10 citations, exactly half of which were by Qu6bec
judges. In short, our study provides support for the claim that while
qu6becois judges are quite prepared to utilize scholarship available only
in English, non-Qu6becjudges, as a group, are slow to make use of works
available only in French. It should be pointed out, however, that Qu6bec
judges do not alway seem as vigorous as they might be in referring to
francophone legal scholarship. While the three books by Tremblay and
Fortinjust referred to were never cited by an anglophonejudge, each was
cited only once by a judge from Qu6bec.
Conclusion
None of the findings of our study came as a shocking revelation to us.
Most of what our research confirmed-from the fact that Peter Hogg was
the most frequently cited scholar to the fact that the Court is more likely
to cite academic authority in a Charter case than in a non-Charter case-
might have been predicted in advance by a casual reader of the Supreme
Court's work. In addition there are many features of the practice of
academic citation by the Supreme Court on which this study failed to
touch. This work is limited in scope and made no effort to examine
citation practice in a comprehensive fashion. Nevertheless, despite the
uncontroversial and relatively limited nature of our findings, we found it
useful to achieve some statistical confirmation of our intuitions. We
found many of these data to have a certain intrinsic interest and present
them here in the hope that others will think the same.
